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Public Reason: A Stranger in Non-Liberal and Religious Societies? 
Abstract 
The article contributes to the discussion of political reasoning in general, and public reason in 
particular, analysed from the vantage point of comparative political theory. It aims to bring out 
the complexity and diversity of actual political reasoning, and it serves as a corrective to some 
over-simplified discussions of public reason, by defenders and critics alike. I argue that the 
notion of public reason can be extended to and is operative in non-liberal and religious 
societies, with the acknowledgment that it needs to undergo a methodological metamorphosis 
in the process. This requires what I call multiple justificatory strategy, which allows the use of 
different justifications in order to respond to the plurality existing in society. However, there 
are certain qualifications in the use of multiple justifications. I argue that this leads to two 
important conclusions, (a) that the functioning of an inclusive notion of public reason requires 
the strategy of multiple justifications, and (b) it contests the inclusivists’ argument of the end 
or superfluity of public reason.   
Keywords: Non-liberal and religious societies, public reason; multiple justifications; Rawls; 
Muslim-majority societies.   
Introduction  
There is an extensive literature on the notion of public reason following John Rawls’s 
theorisation and articulation of the notion. Rawls essentially considers it a principle of liberal 
democratic societies. Other scholars further expounded and developed the notion from different 
perspectives, but still studied in the context of liberal democratic societies. Hardly any 
theoretical elaborations have been made about the potential of the notion of public reason as a 
response to the religious diversity in non-liberal and religious societies, that is, whether in such 
societies religious reasons are offered and advanced without any filters in the process of law 
making.1 Rawls’s wide view of public reason allows the inclusion of religious arguments in 
public justification. Some liberal thinkers have put forward an inclusivist notion of public 
reason to suggest, on the one hand, that public reason liberalism faces a number of challenges 
and, on the other hand, that religious arguments in some circumstances will enter the process 
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of public justification.2 Here I will argue that public reason can be a useful notion in non-liberal 
and religious societies to understand the complexity of legitimacy and justification based on 
various religious and non-religious grounds.3        
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I gives an explanation of what we mean by 
non-liberal and religious societies. What are the main features that are most prominent in these 
kinds of societies, for example, in terms of religion, political legitimacy, justification of the 
law, etc.? In section II, I will be arguing that Rawls’s notion of public reason can be extended 
to and seems to operate in non-liberal and religious societies. However, it will become 
methodologically different in the process of its widening and application in these societies and 
become less Rawlsian. In section III, based on the previous section’s argument, it will be argued 
that a wide notion of public reason requires a strategy of justification that allows religious 
arguments to enter based on certain conditions. I will introduce a notion, what I call multiple 
justificatory strategy, which argues that a polity is legitimately permitted to use different 
justifications in order to reflect the plurality in society and for the sake of stability. In section 
IV, it is argued that in non-liberal and religious societies, the methodological metamorphosis 
of public reason will produce two important conclusions. On the one hand, the functioning of 
the wide notion of public reason requires the strategy of multiple justifications and, on the 
other, this strategy will argue against the inclusivists’ argument of the end of public reason.4    
I. The idea of non-liberal societies   
In discussing the idea of public reason in non-liberal societies, we should first have a clear view 
of the main characteristics of non-liberal societies and the features that distinguish them from 
other political forms and structures. By non-liberal societies, I will refer mainly, but not 
exclusively, to Muslim-majority societies and to religious societies in a broader sense.5 
However, this should not be generalised and, for that reason, I will point out the differences 
that exist among them and the commonalities that exist between them and other religious 
societies that might be considered as liberal, such as Israel. There are at least four main 
variables or criteria on the basis of which we can discuss the idea of non-liberal societies. They 
are political legitimacy, religious authority, the value of toleration and public deliberation. I 
will suggest the following four propositions to identify the nature and meaning of non-liberal 
societies: 
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1. Non-liberal states are legitimate, if they meet the political conditions that they are either 
governed by democratic procedures or, minimally, committed to the soft transfer of 
political power. 
2. Religious authority or establishment is an important feature in these societies, but that 
is not to say that religion is specific only to non-liberal societies. There are liberal states 
that have, more or less, religious societies such as the US, Poland, Ireland, etc. 
3. Toleration in non-liberal societies is not institutionalised by the state. The state’s 
approach towards diverse religions in society is, in some cases, based on the favouritism 
of the majority religion and the recognition of other religious minorities. However, their 
religious rights are not always protected by the law.  
4. Although in such societies a full democratic process for public scrutiny and critical 
discussion cannot be established, a space for public deliberation is, to some extent, 
available in which citizens can debate and contribute to the making of the laws and 
public policies. 
Table 1. Comparison between non-liberal forms of polity and other forms of polity based on 
four variables, intended to show that non-liberal polities are distinct from and not similar to 
authoritarian, theocratic and totalitarian regimes.  
  Non-liberal Authoritarian Theocratic Totalitarian  
Political legitimacy Yes  No?  No? No  
Religious 
authority/establishment 
Religious 
influence and 
authority 
Vested interest 
political gains 
Yes - 
religious 
state 
Vested interest 
political gains  
Toleration Practised but 
not 
institutionalised   
No No No 
Public deliberation Yes No No  No  
 
1. Political Legitimacy 
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There are different grounds according to which certain practices, institutions and political 
arrangements are considered legitimate. A regime is believed to be politically legitimate if it 
practises a democratic rule of governance that allows free democratic participation, guarantees 
democratically justified use of coercive power as well as procedures for public accountability 
and guarantees an extensive set of freedoms and autonomies for citizens (the autonomy to 
choose or not to choose any religion and to have legal and institutional protections not to have 
one’s labour power cheaply exploited in the job market). However, a regime could be said to 
be legitimate by virtue of it is securing political stability or, in Hobbesian terms, when it secures 
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation.6 In this sense, stability will 
become an important political value that contributes to the question of political legitimacy and 
generates citizens’ obligation to obey the law. So, in the context of non-liberal and religious 
societies, these can be claimed to have legitimacy if they guarantee stability together with 
toleration of minorities and other values discussed below. Authoritarian and theocratic regimes 
might be legitimate or illegitimate depending on the extent which stability and other values are 
protected. Although an authoritarian regime might be illegitimate because of its inability to generate 
stability, it doesn’t follow that all its laws are illegitimate and that its subjects are not obliged to obey 
them – say, for example, a morally justified law punishing rapists and murderers.7 However, the 
question of legitimacy in a totalitarian political arrangement is not a valid question since it 
creates terror and not stability.8  
In contrast to the above mentioned political arrangements, non-liberal societies can also be 
called religious societies, whether or not the state is secular or non-secular, though it has to be 
noted that they are not understood to be synonymous. It is always an uneasy task to ascribe 
these descriptions when religion enjoys a special status within the society and the state is 
engaged in some sort of flirtation with the religious establishment or prepared to grant religion 
a bigger role in the political process. Some of these proclaimed secular states, like democratic 
Senegal, India and Turkey have, to a large extent, religious societies and in other non-secular 
states like Indonesia, Israel, Tunisia and Egypt, religion is largely manifest either in their 
politics or as part of their social and cultural composition. The study of public reason, its role 
and function will be different in these religious, democratic or nondemocratic societies 
compared to that in established liberal democracies. I will confine the discussion of non-liberal 
or religious societies to Muslim-majority societies for two reasons: one is methodological and 
the other is normative. First, the argument requires that it is more specific and focused and for 
that reason needs to be narrowed down in terms of scope and applicability. The main interest 
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of this article is to investigate public reason in Muslim-majority societies, though some 
research has been done in other non-liberal, specifically, Confucian contexts (Kim 2015; 2016). 
More importantly, the normative reason behind confining the scope of the argument to Muslim-
majority societies is to construct, from a comparativist political perspective, a notion of public 
reason that aims to reinterpret such political values as public justification, legitimacy and 
deliberation in light of religious and cultural values. This might eventually impact the main 
liberal premises of public reason.      
The governments of non-liberal and religious societies will be considered legitimate if their 
constitutions, laws and institutions acquire authority by virtue of having the right to rule and 
the right to be obeyed by citizens. The non-liberal states’ right or authority to rule is originated 
in their having an effective political authority and are justified in exerting political power, and 
this leads to the obligations of citizens towards one another to obey the law.9 However, since 
these societies are not perfectly just and the democratic systems established in some of them 
do not treat minority groups and different religions on equal terms, these political obligations, 
sometimes, can be questioned. In this paper, I will not attempt to provide a philosophical 
foundation nor will I articulate a conceptual definition of political legitimacy in non-liberal and 
religious societies. Instead, I will give a sketchy outline of political legitimacy that takes 
account of the political and cultural contexts in which the question of legitimacy is studied.10 
Political legitimacy requires that an institution or the state does not become dysfunctional by 
not protecting individuals’ and group’s rights and putting certain groups at a disadvantaged 
position compared to others. The legitimacy of non-liberal polities does not hinge upon the 
principle of liberal legitimacy. The political legitimacy in such religious heterogeneous 
societies is based on a minimalist understanding and is based on practising toleration towards 
religions. It will become clear in the course of the argument which of these societies, based on 
this understanding, will be considered legitimate. The fact that they have religious 
establishments or incorporate religion in their constitutions does not make them illegitimate. 
The justifications offered in these kinds of polity may, in some circumstances, appeal to 
religious arguments in political discussions and deliberations. The only condition that would 
make such polities illegitimate is when they enact religious laws and impose them on all 
citizens and violate toleration, freedom of religion and the right to have no religion.  
2. Religious authority and establishment 
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The question of establishment in Muslim-majority societies is not grounded in the same process 
of establishment of Church as in Western states. The church in Europe, historically, has been, 
prior to disestablishment, a strong religious institution and establishment existing alongside, 
influencing and guiding the state. Church establishment, in its various forms, still exists in 
some liberal democratic states such as in England, Scotland, Norway and Denmark. On the 
other hand, the establishment in Muslim-majority societies is represented in the Sharia and the 
legal and constitutional recognition of Islam as the official religion of the state. However, not 
all Muslim-majority states have the same relation with the Sharia nor do they implement it in 
the same way. The distance between the state and Sharia has been unspecified and varied. In 
almost all Arab states, the sharia has been stipulated as a or the source of legislation and they 
have established a single state religion. However, some of these states like Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt, despite pressures from religious institutions and authority, such as Egypt’s Azhar 
institute, have not always legislated by appeal to religious reasons but, in most cases, appeal to 
secular reasons (more on this later). The same can be said about Israel which has a strong 
establishment and single state religion. Indonesia and India, on the other hand, due to their 
constitutional recognition of a plurality of religions and no state religion, are seen on the path 
of non-establishment.11 The relation between religion and public legislation has been undefined 
and some of them have endeavoured to reconcile the religious law with the civil law, and the 
religious law mainly applied to issues of family law. This can be contrasted with an 
authoritarian or theocratic state, where the latter is explicitly a religious state and the former 
has a vested interest in religious authority by using religion, at times of political crisis, for 
example, to give legitimacy to its authoritarian power. It is here we understand that 
authoritarian states legitimise their political power through the back door of religion and 
religious authority. 
The question of religious authority and the impact of religion on state legislation and politics 
in these societies may vary from one to another according to its religious, ethnic, social and 
cultural constructions. There are other factors that determine religious involvement in politics 
and, therefore, the relationship between religion and the state, such as the political ideology of 
the state, the extent of democratisation and the right of religious freedom, the model of state 
secularisation and the extent of religious legislation that the state has implemented. It is argued 
that the more pluralistic the society is in terms of the multiplicity of religions, ethnicities and 
cultures, the more the rights to religious freedom are protected and the more tolerant it is. 
Looking at Malaysia which has a diversity of religious and ethnic minorities and Tunisia with 
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less diversity, we notice that Malaysia scores on Fox’s dataset (2008) better than Tunisia in 
terms of religious freedom. It fares even better than Turkey which is a secular state modelled 
on the French laïcité of strict separation between religion and the state.12 The model of state 
secularisation has an impact on the state’s capacity to secure religious freedom. Compare two 
Muslim-majority societies which have secular states like Turkey and Senegal which is also 
modelled on the French laïcité, but has adopted a tolerant approach towards its minority 
religions and the Sufi order within Muslims.13 In terms of religious freedom, Senegal has high 
freedom while Turkey has low freedom which is the same as in Egypt, Tunisia and Indonesia.14 
The difference in the state’s accommodation of minority religions and its tolerant approach 
towards all religions are clearly demonstrated by different variables on the same dataset. It is 
interesting to know that there is a big difference between Senegal and Turkey in terms of the 
measure of regulation and restrictions on majority religion or all religions.15 Although both 
secular states score similarly low in terms of religious legislation and both are characterised by 
the disestablishment of Islam, it has to be noted that the current Islamic-minded party (AKP) 
governing Turkey has pushed for legislation favouring increasing Islamisation of society, 
thereby rocking the foundations of the Turkish secular state. 
 
3. Toleration 
As it is argued in the preceding section, the relationship between religion or religious authority 
and the state, in most non-liberal and religious societies, varies according to different factors. 
A significant social and political value closely associated with the discussion of religion and 
religious freedom is toleration, especially in highly pluralised societies. What distinguishes 
these societies from otherwise liberal societies is that even with the secularisation of some of 
the states in the global South, this has not necessarily led to the institutionalisation of toleration 
in non-liberal and religious societies (see Table 1). Toleration as a practice and value is solidly 
rooted in these societies, since it runs through a long tradition of non-liberal and non-Western 
social and political life. It is necessary to understand what notion of toleration is characteristic 
of these societies and in what sense is it not institutionalised? Evidently, a comprehensive 
account of toleration goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
The fact that some of these non-liberal societies are religiously and culturally pluralistic 
suggests that tolerance as a societal principle and value is widely recognised within society 
which is represented by the coexistence of diverse religions. Tolerance here is rendered as a 
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social value that is practised by individuals in their relations with one another and living with 
this plurality of religions and cultures as part of the actual social structure.16 The value and 
practice of toleration exists in major traditions of religious thought. For instance, it played a 
major role in the Confucian and medieval Islamic thought in maintaining the religious and 
cultural heterogeneity of these societies and helped create a framework of coexistence. The 
notion of toleration that runs as a common thread through these religious traditions is an 
epistemological one that is based on the argument from scepticism. Philosophers like Al-Farabi 
and Averroes, who embraced a kind of philosophical scepticism argued that religion might not 
have the exclusive access to truth, but philosophers are the ones who are capable of knowing 
the truth through demonstrative reasoning or syllogisms.17 This quest for finding another 
discipline besides religion that belongs to the realm of truth — in this case, philosophy — 
amounts to a project of scepticism that leaves space for tolerating other worldviews, religions 
and conceptions of the good. The scepticism argument for toleration should not be understood 
as relativism, but as an argument for the existence of other possible religions and ways of life 
that are worthy and hence need to be tolerated.18 In the case of Al Farabi, he clearly 
acknowledges that excellence or perfection is not confined to one’s own religion: ‘It is possible 
that excellent nations and excellent cities exist whose religions differ, although they have as 
their goal one and the same felicity and the very same aims.’19  In Confucian thought, there are 
considerable passages that discourage intolerance even though Confucianism, as Chan argues, 
can be seen as a perfectionist political doctrine as it takes the task of the state to be the 
promotion of morality and virtue. Nevertheless, it does not promote punishment or coercive 
intolerance, but rather ritual religious teaching which helps cure the soul (Chan, 2014, p. 146).            
However, this societal attitude with regard to the cultural and religious pluralisms has not in 
all these societies evolved into an institutionalised practice of toleration.20 Toleration, in this 
case, results from the long history of coexistence of different religions and cultures, the 
adherents of which have lived side by side for centuries. Although this natural toleration has 
existed, a respect or recognition conception of toleration towards other religions, in this case 
minority religions, has not enjoyed full legal protection. The existence of the freedom of 
religious exercise clauses in most of these constitutions has not led to state enforcement against 
intolerant practices of religions.      
It is noted that there are different degrees of toleration even between secular states, depending 
on the normative principles governing their secularisms, whether they are understood as the 
respect and recognition of all religions without discrimination and the openness towards 
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religious reasons or as the strict separation of religion and the state and hostility towards 
religion. If toleration can be measured on the basis of religious discrimination against minority 
religions, it is interesting to note that in a secular state like Turkey the state is very intolerant 
of other minority groups and religions as there is no constitutional recognition of them. 
Notably, Turkey scores 25/90 (where lower is less discrimination),21 higher even than both 
Morocco (20/90) and Tunisia (23/90), a country that was ruled by an authoritarian regime until 
2011.22 
What makes toleration a crucial feature of non-liberal and religious societies is the stability and 
coexistence of cultural and religious pluralisms. The principles of an inclusive notion of public 
reason will be crucial to this very question of stability.23 It will be shown how this particular 
notion in these societies, where tolerance is practiced underpins a non-conflictual relation 
between religion and the state.  
4. Civil rights and political participation   
The question of toleration, discussed in the previous section, which comprises the issues of 
non-discriminatory policies against ethnic and religious minorities, protection of religious 
freedom and social stability based on non-persecution of all religions requires the protection of 
political rights and the provision of certain measures that would allow citizens to participate in 
public deliberation with regard to law making. In non-liberal and religious societies, the degree 
of political rights and opportunities for political participation will vary from one society to 
another and this variation exists even between Muslim-majority societies. These societies enjoy 
some political rights but they do not guarantee all political rights required by justice. However, 
the existence of these limited political rights is what distinguishes these non-liberal societies 
from other theocratic and authoritarian states that do not guarantee any of these rights. Some 
of these non-liberal and religious societies are democratic and some others are not democratic 
but fall somewhere between a restricted democracy or an autocracy and a monarchical system, 
like Egypt and Morocco. However, what is common to all these non-liberal societies, 
democratic or not, is that religion is a central part of political life and it is about ‘public’ 
religion, especially in Muslim-majority societies.   
The main argument is that the relation between religion and the state in non-liberal and 
religious societies, whether their states are secular or non-secular, is more of cohabitation and 
negotiation. The more the state promotes the inclusion of religious arguments in political 
deliberation, the more the state maintains religious pluralism by giving justifications based on 
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religious and nonreligious reasons. The inclusion of religious arguments in the public 
deliberation on law making and the state’s use of coercive power affirms a positive relationship 
between the state and religion and, more importantly, it does not alienate religious citizens 
from the political process. Citizens, religious and nonreligious, would feel alienated if their 
particular arguments which they sincerely hold are excluded from the process of justification. 
The provision and guarantee of political rights and participation to all religious and 
nonreligious citizens in a way that religious arguments can contribute to the advancement of 
social stability will strengthen the process of democratisation. The alienation, antagonism and 
suppression of religion and religious freedom by the state in non-liberal and religious societies 
that have religious diversity is counterproductive and leads to social unrest and brings about a 
less democratic and more authoritarian state.  
To support this argument, I will refer to Fox’s Religion and State dataset to show the 
correlation between a number of Muslim-majority societies with regard to the relation that the 
state has with religion and the level of political rights, participation and democracy that the 
state can guarantee. Two groups of states are taken as examples of Muslim-majority societies 
with two different approaches to religion and, therefore, two different relationships between 
religion and the state. The first group is Indonesia, Senegal and India.24 Indonesia which is a 
non-secular state has the largest Muslim population in the world, and its constitution officially 
recognises a diversity of religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Confucianism. It has a functioning system of democratic government that includes certain 
or limited guarantees of political rights, participation and the protection of religious freedom.25 
According to Fox’s dataset, Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI), Indonesia scores 
6.5/10 (where lower is less regulation), which seems to imply more regulation. However, when 
it is measured according to the religion and state score from 0-100 (in which lower means less 
interaction and greater separation of religion and state), it scores 46.27/100 as shown in (Table 
2). Due to the country’s high diversity of religions, the constitution of Indonesia did not 
establish an Islamic state or sharia law. At the same time, it did not adopt a separationist view 
of religion and the state as it understood religion to be an important part of the public and 
political life of citizens. Senegal, with a Muslim majority and a secular constitution and state, 
is on the lowest index of government regulation of religion and scores the greatest separation 
between religion and state. All three countries, in the first group, Indonesia, Senegal and India 
have low or moderate government regulation of religion with the protection of religious 
freedom. They do not have an antagonistic relation with religion and they all give a public role 
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to religion. All three have democratic governments and they all score high on guaranteeing 
political rights and freedoms (see Table 2).  
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Table 2: Comparison of two groups of Muslim majority societies (with the exception of India) 
to show the relationship between the state’s approach towards religion and the amount of 
rights and freedoms guaranteed. 
 Group 1 Group 2 
 Indonesia  Senegal India  Egypt  Morocco Tunisia  
GRI 6.5/10 0/10 5.8/10 8.3/10 6/10 6.2/10 
Religion and state score 46.27/10
0 
6.61/100 31.34/
100 
56.9/1
00 
36.49/10
0 
44.65/1
00 
Does the government 
generally respect the right to 
freedom of religion? 
Mostly Yes Mostly No No No 
Freedom of expression and 
belief score 
11/16 14/16 13/16 5/16 8/16 4/16 
Associational and 
organisational rights score 
9/12 10/12 10/12 2/12 6/12 2/12 
Political rights scale 2/7 3/7 2/7 6/7 5/7 7/7 
Political pluralism and 
participation 
13/16 14/16 11/16 4/16 7/16 3/16 
 
The second group contains another three Muslim-majority societies: Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia.26 When this group of countries is compared to the first group, it will be clear that the 
level of the state regulation of religion, persecution of minority religions and restrictions on 
majority and minority religions are all very high. These states do not protect religious freedom, 
adopting an antagonistic approach towards religions and controlling both majority and minority 
religions. There are, of course, variations even within this group, for example, Morocco appears 
to be having less regulation than the other two in the group, but this does not identify whether 
the regulation is meant to control or support. In fact, Morocco alongside Egypt and Tunisia is 
among the highest scores (6+) in Fox’s dataset for active state religion: control over support 
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(Fox, 2008, p. 225). All three states in group 2 have poor records, as shown in (Table 2), in 
terms of political rights and freedoms. This shows that the states in this group have controlled 
religion with no protection of religious freedom and this controlling power has led to 
undemocratic governments and the creation of authoritarian states curbing all kinds of freedom.  
II. Religious arguments in public reason and a contentious case of public justification 
How do we understand public reason in non-liberal and religious societies? Each of these 
societies has a different method in excluding religious arguments from and including them in 
the law and the justifications given for a particular law. In contrast to theocratic regimes, the 
states in these non-liberal and religious societies do not always try to provide religious reasons 
to justify the laws or to codify the law in accordance with religious law. The religious 
arguments provided, especially by the societies that possess democratic governments and 
guarantee religious freedom, have contributed to their social stability and the recognition of 
minority religions.  
The wide view of public reason that Rawls introduced in what he called “the proviso” is a 
qualified permission for religious reasons to be included in the political discussion. The proviso 
suggested by Rawls is that “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, 
may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper 
political reasons — and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines — are presented 
that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support.” (1999, p. 152). Rawls’s argument is conditional on the kinds of reason that will be 
subsequently provided for public justification and the process of justification does not require 
political reasons to be provided all along the way. The wide view of public reason allows 
religious reasons not at the end stage of justification, for instance, at the stage of making laws 
or public policies in the parliament, but at the early stages of public discussions, e.g., in town 
halls or public squares or the media. This two-stage process starting from public discussion to 
justification makes it imperative that religious reasons go through a process of transformation 
from moral or religious reasons to political reasons to be eligible for public justification. It is 
important for Rawls and many other scholars that the justification given for a law or policy is 
in terms of political reasons and not religious reasons (Rawls, 1999, p. 153; Macedo, 1997; 
Audi, 2000). The outcome here is comparatively of less significance. What if the law brings an 
egalitarian or just outcome and the only available reasons for the justification of the law was 
in terms of religious reasons that others would find unreasonable to reject or reasonable to 
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accept? Should these reasons be rejected or allowed? I argue that in order to answer the 
question, a different notion and strategy need to be developed that have the potential to allow 
religious reasons in the process of justification. The public justification demand posed by 
Rawls and public reason liberals would restrict their access. I will argue, based on discussing 
the example below, that in non-liberal and religious societies the access of religious reasons to 
the process of justification could lead to just laws. The strategy of justification I develop here 
will, therefore, be different from Rawls’s and the inclusivists’ positions. 
The question that was posed above is different from the concern raised by the inclusivists in 
their objection to public reason liberalism or the exculsivists in two respects. First, what the 
inclusivists in liberal political theory are arguing for is the claim that religious arguments 
should not be excluded from political arguments and justifications, precisely for the reason that 
many religious citizens would oppose unjust and inegalitarian measures or policies, such as 
slavery, torture and cuts to social services.27 Since religious arguments can have this role, they 
should not be excluded from politics and some inclusivist scholars have made a stronger claim 
that “a citizen is morally permitted to support (or oppose) a coercive law even if he has only a 
religious rationale for that law” (Eberle, 2002, p.10). The difference here between the question 
raised above and the concern of the inclusivists is about the political actor who provides the 
justification. For the inclusivists, the main actor is the citizen as to whether she is morally 
required to present political and nonreligious reasons in public justification. The political actor 
in the question raised here is the state, whether the law passed by the state and justified by 
appeal to religious arguments could be reasonably accepted by most citizens, not each and 
every citizen. The claim about political actor is to clarify that it is the state which makes laws 
and, in the following example on polygamy which will be discussed below, it is the state which 
makes the legislation. However, the state, ideally, represents citizens and the legislation is made 
by the parliament as a representative body. Although the political actor here is specified as the 
state, it is individual citizens who are the subject of the legislation and are the agents who 
express their consent or rejection of it. This, as it becomes clear, does not centre on Rawls’s 
demand for the duty of civility according to which citizens have to give reasons to one another 
that they would reasonably accept and which could not include religious reasons as 
justifications, although his proviso extenuated this demand. I concentrate here on the state-
citizen relationship more than on the citizen-citizen relationship. 
Second, the crucial difference is the context. The question raised above is dealing exclusively 
with non-liberal and religious societies, where the state justifies a law in terms of a religious 
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argument based on reasons that appeal to the majority of citizens. However, the object of 
concern for the inclusivists is the liberal secular state, where religion still has a significant 
appeal within a large section of the society, but the use of state power is bound by democratic 
legitimacy with a commitment to the protection of individual and political liberties and the 
recognition of moral pluralism. 
The moral and political validity of the claim that religious arguments form part of the 
justification in non-liberal and religious societies is based on the argument, presented in the 
previous section, that accepting religion in the public space and giving recognition to religious 
arguments, in religiously pluralistic societies, for justifying the laws will lead to a more 
democratic and less authoritarian government. This has been shown by giving the example of 
two groups of Muslim majority states with different attitudes towards religion that determines 
the level of democratization, political rights and protection of religious freedom. The first group 
guarantees religious freedom based on a recognition view and allows greater religious 
arguments in the political life accommodative of their religious plurality as compared to the 
second group.  
Here, I will offer an example to support the argument that if the only available argument for 
justifying a law, that is just and promotes equality, was in terms of a religious argument then it 
is acceptable from the standpoint of the inclusive notion of public reason to provide such an 
argument provided that it produced a progressive law.28  
The example concerns the law on polygamy in Muslim-majority societies. Tunisia is the only 
country among Muslim-majority states which rules polygamy illegal based on a religious 
foundation, namely on an interpretation of the Quran to prohibit such a practice.29 This 
prohibition is:  
based on the standard Modernist reasoning that since the Quran requires that justice be 
done among wives and also warns at the same time that it is impossible to do justice 
among co-wives, this amounts to a prohibition. It has been further argued that polygamy 
is at best only a permitted matter, not obligatory, and, according to a fundamental 
principle of classical Islamic law, the political authority has the right either to ban a 
permissible thing or to make it obligatory in accordance with the need of a given 
situation.30  
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The law passed to ban the practice of polygamy is, therefore, justified in terms of a religious 
reason and not a public political reason. However, the law in itself brings about a progressive 
outcome and it aims to rectify gender inequality within society. The question is: should this 
justification be rejected by citizens, that is, mainly by nonreligious citizens, because it is based 
on a religious argument? While the appeal to religious reasons to justify the ban in a Muslim 
majority society will not go against the normative commitments of devout Muslims, especially 
the traditional Muslims, the appeal to secular or public reasons might raise objections from a 
large section of society.31 However, Mohammad Fadel, for instance, has argued that the 
Tunisian legislation violates public reason because the justification given is religious and not 
“rooted in public reason, for example, that it is harmful to women or children” (Fadel 2007, p. 
11). 
The reason that the justification might not be acceptable for exclusivist public reason is that it 
is the state that provides a religious argument to justify the law. For them it is acceptable if 
citizens, particularly religious citizens, were providing this religious argument to support such 
a law. However, exclusivists would not find this sufficient; they would ask religious citizens 
to translate these religious reasons into secular reasons (Habermas 2006) or present, at a later 
stage, political reasons that such comprehensive doctrines could possibly support (Rawls 
1999).  
The nonreligious citizens would support the law on the prohibition of polygamy as it satisfies 
their demands for a progressive law, but they would not accept the justification given for this 
law. On the other hand, religious citizens would accept the reason given in support of the law 
because it is grounded in a theological text and, therefore, they would support the law. This 
seems to be a case of ‘overlapping consensus’, as religious and nonreligious citizens would 
support the same law for different reasons. However, the justification given by public officials 
and the state for the law does not satisfy public reason, as Fadel argues, as it is not grounded in 
political and nonreligious reasons. Hence, a conflict arises, namely, between a case of 
overlapping consensus – that religious and nonreligious citizens can find reasons to support the 
law – and the demands of public reason,32 as the justification given by the state is not rooted in 
political and nonreligious arguments. Would the nonreligious citizens give weight to the 
justification since the outcome promotes justice and equality? In this particular case, public 
justification and reason seem to be doing no work and they have less significance, at least for 
some citizens, compared to the outcome of the process of justification. To be clear, it is not 
argued that public reason and justification is not important in this case: in fact, they are 
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extremely important for religious citizens who support the law precisely because the reasons 
given are thought to be religious reasons. However, the public justification given has, possibly, 
less weight for secular citizens since the law, which will eventually be enforced, coheres with 
their moral worldviews and political ambitions. Another point that needs to be made clear to 
dispel ambiguity is that the view adopted here is not a consequentialist one. I am not arguing 
that nothing is important but the consequences. I argue that it is important to look at the 
outcome in the socio-political contexts of non-liberal societies which, in this case, is the law 
that is supported or rejected according to different arguments. The law as the outcome of this 
public political deliberation should be given a weight no less than the arguments leading to it.    
If the argument above shows that nonreligious citizens would support the law, it would appear 
that they would support it because a) it is a progressive law; b) they understand that it is not 
always possible for the law to be justified in terms of nonreligious reasons. A possible objection 
that might be raised against this argument could be stated as follows: if the justification of the 
law prohibiting polygamy is based on a religious argument, namely, on Islamic reasoning and 
not on public reason – that is to say, based on the welfare of women and doing justice to 
children – there will still be religious citizens who would oppose the law, as they believe it 
does not reflect the true teachings of their religion and they would find the justification of the 
law in complete contradiction to these teachings. This is a case of conflicting religious 
interpretations and those who object to the law essentially oppose justice and gender equality. 
For that reason, their argument is refuted and discarded from the process of justification on the 
basis that their claims have no moral weight against the rest of the society. This case of 
conflicting religious interpretations could justifiably serve against advancing a religious reason 
that only appeals to a section of conservative-minded (salafist) Muslims who not only stand 
against the substantive content of the law, but also undermine the cohesiveness and stability of 
society. Their particular religious interpretation and reason would estrange other religious 
citizens, who in this case will be the majority, and should not be advanced as it goes against 
the spirit of practical reasoning and political argumentation. This point will be argued within 
the justificatory strategy proposed here to have a normative significance. However, if the 
exclusivist strategy is employed instead to solve this tension by appeal to strictly public and 
nonreligious reasons, the problem we will be facing is that religious citizens, to a large extent, 
will not endorse these reasons as unconvincing and uncompelling and morally antagonistic. To 
the extent that reasons play an important role in the process of justification, the strategy 
proposed here does not frame its core argument on a consequentialist intuition.33       
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III. The process of justification: multiple or singular?  
According to the reading proposed here for public reason, it should not cause concern when a 
religious argument is given to justify a law provided that it demonstrates 1) that the law is 
endorsed by religious and nonreligious citizens; 2) that the law has a progressive nature and 
promotes justice and equality; 3) that religious citizens do not advance a particular religious 
reason, based on a particular interpretation of the faith, that both religious and nonreligious 
citizens could not endorse; 4) that the state should refrain from using religious arguments that 
are deemed to destabilise the moral and religious pluralism of society and violate individual 
freedoms. The inclusion of religious arguments in the process of justification does not mean 
that religious arguments are tout court the only viable options in non-liberal and religious 
societies. Such arguments should be viewed as simply one way of justification among others. 
It follows that public reason in these societies does not disappear but is operationalised when 
it is conceived as the strategy of multiple justifications.34  
These normative criteria are introduced to assure that a religious reason can actually justify 
legitimate laws and the rationale is that without these criteria, non-liberal states would not be 
able to guarantee stability. One of the reasons that members of non-liberal and religious 
societies would accept such normative criteria is that they have no interest in spoiling the moral 
and religious plurality of their societies and consider toleration as an important value. 
Furthermore, civil society in these non-liberal societies would exert pressure on the state to 
adopt these criteria. In the above example, the Tunisian state could not advance a religious 
reason that is based on a conservative and particularistic interpretation of the faith that would 
lead to not being endorsed by nonreligious and a large segment of religious citizens. Hence, 
the state has the duty to refrain from supporting religious arguments and reasons that jeopardize 
the political legitimacy of the state and undermine the value of toleration. The justification for 
these four normative criteria is grounded in the fact that they are realistic and that non-liberal 
societies have an interest in endorsing them. In non-liberal societies, most religious citizens, 
who do not find democracy inconsistent with their values, would endorse the progressive nature 
of the law as they do not want a particularistic and religious – conservative argument to be 
advanced and eventually win the support of the state.            
In the preceding section, I argued that religious arguments are, in certain circumstances, part 
of public justification and I demonstrated that they can produce progressive laws. This section 
will try to prove that religious arguments are not always appealed to in non-liberal and religious 
 19 
societies to justify the laws, rather, in most cases, nonreligious and secular reasons are provided 
to justify the laws. I contend that public reason in these societies will still have a place, but 
should be understood as an inclusive notion that employs multiple justifications. 
Regarding the plurality of justifications and, hence, religious arguments in the process of 
justification and the use of public reason in non-liberal and religious societies, there are two 
claims that can be made: a factual and a normative claim. The factual claim is that religion and 
religious arguments in most of these non-liberal and religious societies do not only form the 
socio-cultural context, but also they enter state legislation and the process of justification of 
some laws. This claim is based on the fact that most of the constitutions and laws of these 
countries have explicit references to religion or give status to religious jurisdictions or 
authorities. The normative claim, however, is that despite these references to and the status of 
religion, these states do not always appeal to religious reasons because of their contentious 
nature and unfair consequences. Instead, in most cases, they use nonreligious public reasons to 
justify the laws and policies in order to avoid the charges of sectarianism and religious 
discrimination and to generate political stability.35 This latter claim asserts that the process of 
justification in non-liberal and religious societies follows multiple lines of justification 
including religious ones and that this notion implies a moral and political duty on states to 
support those justifications that lead to non-sectarian, non-discriminatory and just laws. In 
some instances, the reasons that were appealed to by some of the non-liberal states to justify 
religious discrimination and restrictions on religious freedom were not religious reasons. The 
Egyptian state, for example, in its discriminatory laws against the Copts and Baha’is did not 
appeal to the majority religion’s authority or Islamic law. Instead, it appealed to secular 
nonreligious conceptions, such as ‘public order’, to restrict or ban the religious practices of 
minority religions.36  
The strategy of multiple justifications in non-liberal and religious societies, such as Muslim 
majority societies that are not ruled by theocratic regimes, functions on the basis that while 
secular and nonreligious reasons and arguments form part of the justification of decisions and 
laws, religious arguments also play a role in justifying certain laws that pertain to family 
jurisdiction. However, the caveat is that even at the level of family jurisdiction, not all religious 
arguments can produce laws that will generate social justice. These particular areas of concern 
should be limited by other nonreligious arguments that address questions of justice and 
equality.  
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The historical precedent of using mixed justifications for laws can be found in polities that 
were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. If we wished to consider the mixed or multiple 
justifications as the processes that are grounded on the appeal to various juridical codes, a clear 
historical example of this is nineteenth century Egypt, a period when it was ruled by the 
Ottomans and European colonial powers. Because of the diverse religious, cultural and 
demographic components of the countries which were subject to the empire – such that in some 
places, non-Muslims were the majority of the population, a system of diverse jurisdictions 
applied to these diverse peoples. While , courts applied to Muslim populations alongside 
customary laws that had mainly applied to rural populations, the millet system and court applied 
to various non-Muslim sects and religious groups, mainly, Christians and Jews.37 In Egypt, for 
example, the European powers introduced Mixed courts which had jurisdiction over European 
residents and administered their civil affairs and relations with the Egyptian population.38 The 
existence of these different courts and systems for managing religious plurality was, 
undoubtedly, discriminatory and unequal by the modern standards of equal recognition of 
different religions. However, what is interesting here in studying the Ottoman system of 
religious diversity is that the process of legislation was not based on the appeal to a single and 
universal process of justification. They, instead, were justified according to different religious 
reasons as well as nonreligious reasons. Thus, in the metropole of the Islamic Ottoman empire 
and its peripheries such as Egypt, sharia courts were not the only juridical foundation according 
to which all laws were justified. Sharia courts were set to resolve issues related to religious and 
family matters. In all other matters, different nonreligious justifications were used and civil 
codes – derived from European legal codes – were applied in the Mixed and National courts in 
Egypt.39  
The reliance on different justifications and courts allowed religious reasons to be part of the 
public domain and thus, the distinction between religion and politics is less clear in Muslim-
majority societies. However, the strategy of multiple justifications does not attempt to build or 
solidify the project of the separation of judicial spheres as, for instance, between the jurisdiction 
in family matters and the jurisdiction in other civil matters. In the legal foundations of most 
Muslim-majority societies, the law in personal matters such as in marriage, inheritance, 
divorce, etc., is often conflated with individuals’ religious identity and thus sharia has become 
part of what is regarded as the law of personal status. Against this backdrop, the strategy 
proposed here does not attempt to valorise the division between public and personal laws in 
which sharia covers the latter and becomes part of the legislation of the citizens’ personal 
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matters. The strategy of multiple justifications then tries to transcend this division and it 
emphasises that religious reasons might be able to play a part in the justification of particular 
laws, reasons that might not be publicly objectionable. These religious reasons will not be 
publicly objectionable if they satisfy the four conditions set out at the beginning of this section.  
The objection that could be put to the multiple justificatory strategy is that it is too permissive 
as it always allows religious reasons to enter the process of justification thereby changing the 
methodology of public reason. However, in non-liberal and religious societies the methodology 
of public reason will inevitably change. Religious arguments will not only be presented in 
support of reasons that are deemed to be public: they will be part of the process of justification 
as the inclusive notion of public reason tries to emphasise. In response to the former objection, 
the multiple justificatory strategy will not allow religious reasons to always enter the process 
of justification, but only when they satisfy the conditions set out above.  
IV. The strategy of multiple justifications and broadening public reason 
If the inclusive notion of public reason is read as flexible enough to allow different reasons to 
enter public justification, the strategy of multiple justifications seems to be crucial in non-
liberal and religious societies, especially in the religiously pluralistic ones, to maintain stability. 
Some examples of these societies have been provided above to show the role of religion in 
public and political life. Equally, it has been demonstrated that the most stable of these societies 
are those which give religion a public role and, in some cases, allow religious arguments to be 
publicly used in justifying the laws. The strategy of multiple justifications aims, therefore, to 
respond to and address the deficiencies that exist in the theory of public reason liberalism and 
the theory that declares the end of public reason. The “multiple justifications strategy” does 
embody a distinctive model of public reason essentially because it is a strategy in non-liberal 
and religious societies and it is distinct in two ways. First, it is different from public reason 
liberals (or what some call it the standard view) in that it permits religious arguments alongside 
nonreligious arguments in the process of public justification and not only at the level of 
citizens’ discussion. Second, it is distinct from the inclusivists’ view in that it does not permit 
religious arguments without qualifications. It permits religious arguments only if it leads to 
progressive laws and policies. The argument presented up to this point has been in support of 
an inclusive notion of public reason that sees religious reasons, in some circumstances, to be 
part of the justification of laws that promote justice and equality. The strategy of multiple 
justifications then addresses this need and its appeal lies in its potential to construct an 
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equilibrium between different reasons and arguments that compete to offer justifications. In 
non-liberal and religious societies, in particular, this strategy helps create a degree of balance 
between religious and nonreligious citizens’ views in terms of the arguments they present 
against or in support of the laws.  
The secular constitution of India, for example, has not prevented the state giving a prominent 
public role to religion and building its principle of secularism on a model that is adaptive to 
religious arguments. A strict line, therefore, has not been drawn between religion and the 
public: religion is not depublicized (Bhargava, 2011, p.104).40 The working model of the 
strategy of multiple justifications in the Indian model of accommodating religion in public and 
political life, seems to be crucially important for the preservation of peace between diverse 
religious communities (see Bhargava, ibid). Considering the multifaith reality of India, the 
presence of religiosity in public life and its significance in the life of individuals and society, 
the secularism of the state is defined by this omnipresence of religion and religiosity. Not only 
rituals and ceremonials but also individuals’ moral and ethical principles define what religion 
is.  However, the term ‘secular state’ does not appear in the Indian constitution and the state-
religion relationship is not based on any principle of neutrality. Despite granting and securing 
religious freedom to all adherents of different religions, the state has reserved the right to 
interfere in religious matters. Article 25 of the constitution on religious freedom allows the 
state to intervene in religious matters in the interest of social reform.41 It states that this article 
should not prevent ‘the state from making any law providing for social welfare and reform.’42 
The fact that the state engages with religion and perceives it as integral to both individuals and 
communities, by making the financial support of educational institutions based on religion or 
language a constitutional right runs counter to the secular model of excluding religion from the 
public. The principle that the state should refrain from giving, as Smith argues, “financial aid 
and other forms of patronage to religion finds no support in Hindu, Buddhist, or Islamic 
traditions” (Smith, 1999, p.183). From the perspective of the strategy of multiple justifications, 
the Indian constitution accommodates diverse religious and nonreligious arguments and grants 
them free space in the public. Even though the constitution does not establish an official 
religion nor does it recognise a certain religion as the majority’s religion, it does not, at the 
same time, adopt an exclusivist notion of public reason.           
This strategy is also a response to the theory that declares the end of public reason.43 It is not 
argued here that this strategy ends the point and purpose of public reason, it only broadens its 
scope and argues that religious reasons are not sufficient on their own. There is, thus, a need 
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for public reason in non-liberal and religious societies. The example of the Indonesian 
constitution attests to how this Muslim-majority society could not exclude religious or 
nonreligious public arguments from the legislative and decision making processes. In the 
constitution, the two sides of the argument were presented. On the one hand, religion was not 
excluded from public life and certain areas of legislation and, on the other, the constitution 
framers appealed to a nonreligious secular principle to justify the founding of a non-religious 
state. In the 1945 constitution, the new Indonesian state adopted what is known as the 
Pancasila, the five founding principles of the state: belief in God, justice and humanity, unity 
of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberation and, finally, the realization 
of social justice.44 These principles give a clear indication of how the state tries to negotiate its 
relation with religion and adopt a strategy in which both religious and nonreligious arguments 
can play a role in the justification of the laws.45  
However, which one has the priority over the other when it comes to making the laws? When 
and how should the religious argument be employed? And should, the religious or non-
religious be taken as the essential argument for making or justifying the laws? The suggested 
answer based on the argument advanced above is that non-religious arguments should be the 
essential principle in any law-making processes. The founding principles, such as justice 
(freedom and equality), democracy, protection of human rights and toleration should take 
priority over any other arguments that contradict these principles. Religious arguments cannot 
be employed if they deem to violate these principles and they can only be offered if they support 
laws that advance these values. Religious arguments cannot be taken as essential unless the 
state in question is a theocracy that does not recognise any but the religious laws. To make my 
point even clearer, religious arguments are only useful in the justification processes for granting 
the actual acceptance of the law and consequently assuring stability.  
In the multiracial and multifaith context of Indonesia –where Muslims dominate as the largest 
majority – these questions have been settled by prioritising non-religious reasons and 
arguments over religious ones. In the run up to independence, the Islamists wanted the 
independent Indonesia to be an Islamic state and some of them wanted sharia to be included in 
the constitution and to be applied to Muslims. However, the founders of the new state saw that 
an Islamic state was untenable with Indonesia’s level of plurality and so decided not to include 
sharia in the 1945 constitution, as this would have alienated other religions.46 The founders of 
the new state chose, instead, to appeal to non-religious or public reasons, outlined in the five 
principles as the foundations of the state. This is an appeal to a notion of public reason, aligned 
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with the strategy of multiple justifications, which allows religious arguments and reasons to 
play a part in public justification. They offered compromises to the Islamists by including the 
belief in God in the constitution. However, they did not succumb to the pressure to establish a 
religious state and, instead, appealed to the values of democracy and social justice. The reliance 
on this qualified inclusive notion of public reason and an accommodationist approach towards 
religion has created a marked difference, as argued in the first section, between a religious 
society like Indonesia and other religious societies, like Egypt, in terms of the political stability 
and democratic rule that each could achieve.   
 25 
Notes  
1 Some exceptions are the works by Sungmoon Kim, who argues for public reason 
perfectionism as opposed to public reason liberalism. He considers it exclusively in a 
Confucian context and, hence, puts forward public reason Confucianism as one of its 
variations. See , e.g., Kim (2015; 2016).  
2 Liberal inclusivists have raised several objections against public reason liberalism or 
exculsivists, see, e.g., Vallier and D’Agostino (2013); Eberle (2002); Eberle and Cuneo 
(2015); Gaus (2012); Gaus and Vallier (2009); March (2013). On the other side, Macedo 
(1997); Schwartzman (2004); Quong (2011); Audi (2000) defend public reason liberalism 
and the exclusion of religious reasons from public justification.        
3 I shall make it clear, right at the outset, that the main aim of this paper is not to write a critique 
of public reason theorists nor is it a survey of public reason theories. I will attempt to 
reconstruct, in a preliminary way, an account of public reason that is specific to the non-
liberal and religious context.  
4 The closest notion to the notion of multiple justificatory strategy is legal pluralism. A system 
that adopts legal pluralism is to employ within its legislative body different legal sources 
which different religious or cultural groups can appeal to in adjudicating social, family and 
civil matters. However, the notion of multiple justificatory strategy is different in an 
important sense, namely that it concerns itself with the different justifications that the 
political system offers in support of a law or public policy. In contrast to the thesis of legal 
pluralism, it does not hold the position that every religious or cultural citizen or group should 
be able to appeal to a law, that is, originated in their own faith or doctrine. It also focuses on 
the idea that in non-liberal and religious societies, nonreligious reasons alongside religious 
reasons could be advanced to justify a law. It will become clear later in the argument that 
what kind of religious arguments can be advanced and how the possible implications for 
individuals’ exclusion can be prevented. On legal pluralism, see Menski (2006, 82-129). 
5 I should mention here as an obvious connection Rawls’s ‘decent non-liberal societies.’ 
Despite this affinity, there is a clear distinction between Rawls’s ideal type and mine in that 
while Rawls’s model belongs to his ideal theory and he offers an imagined society, 
‘Kazanistan,’ I deal with non-liberal and religious societies as real and not imaginary 
societies and, therefore, my criteria will be different from Rawls’s in identifying these types 
of societies.    
6 See Williams (2005, 3) for putting it in this way. 
7 See Simmons (1999, 770).  
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8 In a theocratic regime like Saudi Arabia political legitimacy cannot be established, because 
of the absence of the political values of toleration towards minority religions and cultures, 
public deliberation and accountability, and because of the imposition of a religious authority 
above all other legislations. But, it might be argued that political legitimacy in a theocratic 
regime like Iran can be established since after the Iranian revolution in 1979, people voted 
through a referendum for an Islamic republic. However, its legitimacy fades away when it 
starts to eliminate political dissent, impose a single religious authority and a politics of 
intolerance.       
9 See Buchanan (2002) where he argues that the notion of political authority includes both the 
right to be obeyed and the justification for wielding political power.  
10 See, e.g., Horton (2012).  
11 Bader (2007, 54) makes helpful distinctions between strong establishment and weak 
establishment and the resultant distinctions between disestablishment and non-
establishment and their various meanings in different socio-historical contexts.  
12 See ARDA website on the link below for these figures: 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/MultiCompare4.asp?c=73,%20225,%20197,%2
0108,%20139,%20109,%20226,%20113  See also Fox (2008). 
13 It is noted on Fox’s dataset that Senegal scores zero out of ten for government regulation of 
religion index (lower is less regulation), while Turkey scores 5.1 out of ten. See also Stepan 
(2011) for a detailed discussion of these points and a comparison between different models 
of secularism. See also Stepan (2000).  
14 If measured between low, moderate and high on Fox’s dataset. 
15 Senegal scores (3/87) but Turkey scores (35/87), see ARDA. 
16 See, e.g., Reid and Gilsenan (2007). 
17 See Averroes (Hourani, 1961).  
18 For a detailed analysis of the paradoxes and limits of toleration, see Forst (2013). 
19 See Abu Nasr al-Farabi (Walzer, 1985, 281); see also Nederman (2011, 353). 
20 On the difference between tolerance and toleration, see Bader (2007).  
21 Turkey under the rule of the AKP is undergoing a process of Islamisation and the regime is 
drifting into authoritarianism which started after 2007, after the consolidation of its power 
and the success it gained in the past four consecutive rounds of legislative elections since 
2002. After his success in the presidential election in 2014, Erdogan has been steadily 
sinking the country in authoritarian policies that witnessed their peaks in the purge of his 
opponents after the failed coup of 2016 and the 2017 referendum for constitutional changes 
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which after the 2018 election victory have led to the perpetuation of his presidency. See 
Human Rights Watch’s world report of 2015 and 2018 on Turkey; see also Yesilada and 
Rubin (2011). 
22 Whereas in Senegal the state is more tolerant towards other ethnic and religious groups and 
recorded no discrimination case scoring 0/90. See ARDA. 
23 I have no intention to discuss Rawls’s notion of stability. His notion in Political Liberalism 
(Rawls, 1996) is the stability for the right reasons, the achievement of which centres on the 
acceptance by all citizens of the political conceptions of justice that is consistent with their 
comprehensive doctrines. This also brings up the discussion of the duty of civility and this 
has been subject to criticisms and generated massive discussion on this topic. As I have 
made it clear, I do not intend to review the literature on public reason, and this goes beyond 
the aim of this article. 
24 India is not a Muslim majority state but it has the third largest Muslim population in the 
world. The example of India is given here as an example of a religious society that gives 
significant role to religion in the public life and that it is a secular democratic state. 
25 Indonesia’s democracy was not without great failures. Under the rule of Sukarno from 1959-
1967 the country was under an authoritarian regime and the following president, Suharto, 
was clinging to power for several decades.  
26 It has to be said that the argument here is based on Fox’s 2008 dataset and at that time Tunisia 
was an authoritarian state, but this has changed since the popular uprising of 2011 and 
establishment of new governments.  
27 See Zerilli (2012); Waldron (2012); Wolterstorff (1997). See also March (2013) for a 
discussion of the inclusivists’ arguments for the inclusion of religious reasons and a different 
inclusivist argument.  
28 This condition does not exist in the inclusivists’ position. Eberle (2002), for example, permits 
the use of purely religious arguments in support of a coercive law without describing the 
nature of the law. In my account, this condition is crucial to secure progressive laws in 
political contexts where guaranteeing such laws require much civil society pressure and 
struggle.  
29 The other exception is Turkey which bans the practice based on the country’s secular 
foundation and laws. 
30 Rahman (1980, 457). 
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31 Fazlur Rahman argued for this as it appears in the quote mentioned above. Another Muslim 
scholar who argued for the prohibition of polygamy based on Islamic reasons was a 
prominent late Ottoman-era jurist, Mansurizade Said, see Kurzman (2002), quoted in Fadel 
(2007, 11).  
32 Here if public reason is understood in its standard or exclusivist notion. 
33 For this last point, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this to 
clarify the argument.  
34 The strategy of multiple justifications could perhaps be read along the lines of convergence 
theories of public reason offered by Gaus (2009), Stout (2004), D’Agostino (1996) and 
Vallier (2009, 2011, 2014). However, the main differences between the strategy proposed 
here and convergence conception of public reason can be summarised in the following. First, 
methodologically speaking, the strategy of multiple justifications, not to be too ambitious, 
is mainly designed for non-liberal and religious societies and not for liberal and secular 
societies. Second, while the convergence conception puts emphasis on individual reasons 
that satisfy the intelligibility requirement (Vallier, 2014, 106) to support laws, it does not 
put much emphasis on the outcome, i.e., the laws and public policies. The strategy of 
multiple justifications, by contrast, does not permit religious reasons unless they satisfy the 
four conditions set out in section 3.         
35 The political instability of some of the non-liberal societies like Egypt and other Middle 
Eastern countries is not due to the fact that religious legislations are part of the law but it is, 
to a large extent, due to the political authoritarian structure that dominates in the region and 
which controls religion and discriminates against religious minorities. 
36 On this point, see, e.g., Mahmood (2015); Mahmood and Danchin (2014, 130); Agrama 
(2012). 
37 The Ottomans established the millet system to keep non-Muslim communities under the 
tutelage of the empire, especially Christians and Jews who are considered People of the 
Book and were administered according to the dhimma system by granting them a certain 
amount of rights and autonomy. Under this system, they could practise their faith and 
exercise their own jurisdictions in family issues. However, this system was based on two 
unequal terms. First, it imposed on these communities a poll tax (jizya). Second, these 
communities, under this system, enjoyed lower status and rights than Muslims. In fact, non-
Sunni Muslims did not have the same rights as Sunni Muslims. For a fuller discussion of 
these points, see, for example, An-Naim (2008, 184-96). 
38 See Asad (2003, 210-11). 
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39 Mixed courts were those courts which were administered by European judges and in which 
the legal matters of European inhabitants in their dealings with the Egyptians were governed. 
For a detailed account of these legal transformations in the nineteenth century Egypt, see 
Asad, ibid. 
40 An-Naim also argues that in India it was only during the British colonial rule when religion 
was privatised. “What British colonial officers believed to be ‘personal’ and ‘religious’ law 
became synonyms, though such closed categories would not have made sense for Hindus 
and Muslims in their precolonial experiences… What the colonial administrators decided 
was the realm of ‘personal’ matters, such as marriage and inheritance, was the repository of 
religious identity.” An-Naim (2008, 149).       
41 On this point see D.E. Smith (1999, 193).  
42 http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-4March2016.pdf  
43 See, e.g., Zerilli (2012); Enoch (2015).  
44 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/id/id048en.pdf  
45 This role playing process cannot and should not occur at the same time. So if nonreligious 
arguments used to justify the law, then this should be sufficient and no effort should be made 
to find similar religious reasons. The state should not try to simultaneously accommodate 
both nonreligious and religious arguments to support or reject a law. The religious argument 
is seen to be usefully effective where other arguments cannot play that effective role in 
bringing different perspectives together and maintain the stability of society.  
46 See An-Naim (2008, 224). 
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